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Abstract 
The quality control of structural elements for post disaster reconstruction in the field is 
problematic. Test facilities are often remote, training can be inadequate and the attitude 
of suppliers and contractors can be negative towards such controls resulting in less then 
adequate construction. This paper outlines several techniques that have been used to 
address such issues that included of the following: 
 
• Foundation checking using scala penetrometer testing 
• Concrete strength testing using rebound hammer testing 
• Rebar placement using cover meters 
 
These are all tests that can be completed in the field, give immediate test results that can 
be repeated if required and provide positive evidence for the doubting suppliers and 
contractors. Such tests have been used in housing projects in Banda Aceh, Sri Lanka and 
India with this paper focusing on the context in Banda Aceh, Indonesia.   
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Introduction  
Many aid agencies responded to the need for permanent housing following the Asian 
Tsunami of 26 December 2004. In Aceh Indonesia, agencies had to deal with the usual 
challenges of a lack of skilled trades people and professional staff in an unregulated 
building industry that seemed to readily accept low quality work. Nonetheless, aid 
agencies were mandated to provide “durable” houses, that were “sustainable”, that 
allowed people to live in “dignity” and to advocate housing as a basic “right”. This meant 
that houses had to be seismically “safe”.  The houses in Aceh typically consisted of 
reinforced concrete frame structures infilled with bricks walls, timber truss roofs and 
corrugated iron roofing with the reinforced concrete frames providing the seismic bracing. 
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The poor quality of construction and concerns about the durability of the houses being 
constructed soon lead to a discussion of what was “good enough” under the challenges 
of a post disaster reconstruction economy as outlined above (World Vision, 2007). Then 
in the height of this issue, agencies realized there were also serious seismic design 
shortcomings and that the construction documentation they had been working to was 
flawed. These design flaws were due to the following main design issues (NZSEE, 2006):  
 
• The mass of the brick infill walls in seismic calculations was ignored as being “non 
structural” thus reducing the design seismic loads by around 50% of what they 
should have been. 
• The selection of the highest seismic factor R(=8.5) which would ensure the lowest 
seismic load was automatically done but not reflected in the remainder of the 
design. The R value reflects the type of structure selected and as detailed should 
of possibly been between 3.5 to 5.5. Consequently, seismic loads were reduced by 
35-60% than what the house should/could have been designed for.  
• Brick walls were not isolated or separated from their concrete frames thus 
compromising the seismic performance of the frames. This was connected to the R 
value issue above and with such a structural system a R between 2.2 to 3.5 should 
have used. Consequently, seismic loads were reduced by 60-74% than what the 
house should/could have been designed for.  
• Finally, there were inadequate details for joints, potential seismic hinge zones and 
confinement reinforcing shown on the drawings together with non seismic detailing 
of ties.  
 
These aspects appear to have been commonly accepted by structural designers in Aceh. 
Nonetheless, it meant that the house design would not meet the national building code 
standards 1 (though in Indonesia house design follow a guide put out by the Public Works 
Department2 that has lower criteria) or international standards even if the stipulated 
material qualities and strengths were achieved. Agencies were divided over whether they 
had achieved satisfactory seismic compliance because of this split but for the aid agency 
in this study there were two major structural issues to be addressed that were as follows 
(Arup, 2006): 
 
1) The seismic design of the houses being built was less than would be acceptable in 
other countries. 
2) The material quality and strengths were poor. 
 
In reality, both issues were further compromised by unauthorised substitution and 
changes on site such as 12mm diameter column reinforcing being changed to 10mm, 
8mm diameter column links being changed to 7mm and column cages for a smaller 
150x150mm column being used in a 200x200 mm column. Thus, to adhere to their 
mandated values required an assessment of their significant building programs that had 
been running for 4 years.  
 
                                            
1
 Indonesian Seismic Loading Code SNI 1726 -2002 
2
 Refered to in Indonesian as the “Petunjuk Pembuatan Rumah Sederhana Tahan Gempa”. It is a set of 
recommendations that do not reflect the seismic zone, foundations conditions or structural type factors in 
the building code. 
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Houses were seismically redesigned and a more instrument based testing regime 
implemented and this paper reviews the role of the testing regime adopted by this agency 
and it’s application to approximately 1,100 houses on both original sites (those retuning 
home) and new sites. 
Research method 
The paper uses a case study approach from which general conclusions are suggested. 
The research hypothesis is that a SMART approach to structural quality control can bring 
about a cultural shift in post disaster reconstruction. The SMART approach is a 
mnemonic often used in project management that stands for the following3: 
S Specific, M Measurable, A Attainable, R Relevant, Realistic, or Results/Results-
focused/Results-oriented and T Time-bound.  While this sounds straight forward the 
reality is that in developing economies under the typical shortages of skills and resources 
in the post disaster context doing what seems reasonable is invariably difficult. 
  
The overall post disaster context in Banda Aceh (as outlined earlier) is more specifically  
described by da Silva (da Silva, 2010) “After the tsunami the need to design for 
earthquakes was overlooked strategically by BRR (The Indonesian Government’s Agency 
charged with coordinating the reconstruction) and many implementing agencies. BRR 
justified the fact that most of their construction was not seismically resilient on the 
grounds that to make it so was probably cost prohibitive and that reconstruction 
timescales did not allow for additional design time.” She continues that there was an 
issue with the Disasters Emergency Committee (DEC) Strategic Framework. DEC is an 
alliance of 13 large UK based humanitarian agencies and the framework “specifically 
referred to reducing vulnerability to natural hazards. However, in practice the extent to 
which DEC Member Agencies appreciated the importance of seismic resilience, and how 
to achieve it, was largely dependent on the degree to which they employed external 
expertise, and the timeliness of this advice in shaping their proposals.”  Moreover, “many 
agencies experienced challenges in achieving adequate seismic design. Some had to 
demolish and rebuild houses and others retrofitted solutions to enhance seismic 
performance. There was confusion over codes and standards promoted through the UN 
Humanitarian Information Centre that resulted in a “prescriptive” specification for various 
building elements that “failed to include basic good seismic design practice in relation to 
symmetry, openings, wall panel sizes, ring beams, ductile reinforcement detailing and ties 
between elements. Several agencies complied with the (prescriptive specification) 
assuming that it was sufficient or that local designers and contractors knew what they 
were doing without realising that safe construction practices were not common practice”.  
 
Finally, she adds that “local engineering consultants employed by implementing agencies 
to develop structural designs generally had limited experience of seismic design, which 
typically requires an additional post-graduate qualification. This resulted in poor design 
solutions which were not compliant with the Indonesian (building) code. Recognising this, 
some agencies employed specialist international consultants or firms to develop or check 
designs, or sought advice from local and national universities. International engineers 
were also employed as consultants in-house. However, many of these engineers did not 
                                            
3
 Doran, George T. "There's a S.M.A.R.T. way to write management’s goals and objectives." Management 
Review, Nov 1981, Volume 70 Issue 11. 
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previously have seismic design experience and so were ascending a learning curve, 
trying to follow available guidance and incorporate it into the construction drawings.”  
 
This case study (unfortunately) appears to be typical for other aid agencies in Banda 
Aceh and potentially for other seismic disaster reconstruction such as Haiti. But, the 
sensitivities involved has meant a scarcity of public discussion and literature despite the 
“pain” and apparentness to those in the field as inferred by da Silva’s description. This is 
in part the reason for this paper that seeks to show another alternative approach of 
resolution through appropriate quality control measures and consequently the use of a 
more quantitative research approach.  
 
Research question or research hypothesis   
• Were the in field quality testing procedures selected effective?  
• Could these be used in other housing programmes?  
 
Research context; a culture of change 
Any decision to change plans in the middle of construction is difficult. A significant amount 
of effort, consultation, design and procurement had already been invested in the plans 
that this agency was using for their house construction and hence acceptance of the 
need to change was painful at all levels of the agency. The quality issues in the field and 
the seismic re-design of the houses highlighted three key areas: 
 
1. There were no house plot specific tests of the soil bearing capacity.  
2. The strength of the concrete was always going to be questionable given that it was 
being manually mixed on site.  
3. Reinforcing was firstly not placed accurately and was also not rigidly held in place 
and hence moved when the concrete was placed.  
 
Contractors were not building to the drawings or specifications but were making changes 
on site without any reference or authority as indicated earlier. Moreover, the structural 
quality process at this point was based on a visual inspection that contractors often 
plastered before they could be inspected. This was the norm prior to the tsunami.    
 
On the inspection side, construction supervision staff were not sufficiently skilled or 
sufficiently confident to insist on the contractors (who were usually local elders or leaders) 
complying with the construction documents. The resulting poor quality was to be 
expected. In some cases, it was so poor that instead of being “low strength” it was “no 
strength” concrete. Hence, this “building culture” was the issue to be addressed.  
 
The importance and place of the structural design of the house was not appreciated and 
this was where the first need existed. In seismic design the selection of the design 
strategy (represented by the selection of the structural system it’s material) sets the areas 
for absolute quality control and detailing of the remainder of the house. In particular, the 
selection of the seismic “R” value. What is perhaps not understood is that seismic loading 
on any building or house actually depends on the selection of this R value and the higher 
the R value the lower the seismic load that the house needs to be designed to. Buildings 
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are not usually designed for the full seismic loading of an earthquake. Requirements for 
windows and doors usually mean that some lower level of seismic load is selected. 
However, this lower seismic loading comes at a cost and it requires more stringent design 
and control of the ends of beams, beam column joints and columns bases. Designers will 
at times use a lower R value and accept the higher seismic loading as it results in easier, 
faster and more economical construction. Again as outlined by da Silva, this was not 
coordinated or understood within either the aid or the local structural community and only 
to a limited extent in the international engineering community.  
Other challenges for testing. 
In addition to being aware of this complicated “cultural” climate were more practical 
issues related to the logistics of any testing and quality control. The testing needed to 
address the following:   
 
• It needed to be robust 
• It needed to be straight forward 
• It needed to be immediate 
• It needed to be portable 
• And it needed to be quick 
  
Consequently, the testing equipment selected for this work consisted of the following: 
 
1. A scala penetrometer for testing soil bearing capacity (cost $300US). This 
NZ/Australia invention measures the depth of penetration of a standard cone under 
the impact of a 9 kg weight dropped 510mm (NZS4402, 1988). It satisfied all of the 
above criteria but did need work back in the office to get final results. 
2. A rebound (or Schmidt) hammer for checking concrete strengths (cost around 
$1,000US). This measures the rebound of a steel plunger driven into the concrete 
by a known amount of energy (ASTM C805, 2008). This satisfied all of the criteria 
though operators did require practice to coordinate the locking of the plunger after 
being driven into the concrete.   
3. A cover meter for locating reinforcing (cost $5,500US). This measures the flux 
associated with the steel reinforcing and satisfied all of the criteria but it was 
relatively expensive compared to the other equipment. 
 
The interesting part was the “cultural” impact of these testing procedures. 
 
The development of testing criteria 
The implementation of the quality system came after most of the houses had been 
constructed. Thus, the design mentioned earlier became the basis for the design of 
retrofitting for houses yet to be constructed but also the testing criteria for houses that 
were substantially complete. The criteria associated with the 3 key quality areas identified 
above were as follows:  
 
1. A minimum allowable soil bearing capacity of 75 kPa under seismic loading. This 
was based on the correct seismic loading being applied to the building. 
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2. A minimum concrete strength of 10 MPa. This was a low value and in many 
countries would possibly not be called concrete. It was also accepted that at best 
rebound hammers had a repeatability of ±20%.   
3. A minimum outside of reinforcing to outside of reinforcing of 90mm for columns. 
With 12mm diameter column reinforcing this represented a gap between the 
vertical rebar of 66mm. This was required to ensure sufficient structural action of 
the columns.   
 
These were measured at the sites identified in table 1 below.   
 
Insufficient soil bearing capacity at any one of the 3 test locations constituted a fail and a 
recommendation to demolish regardless of the other test results. If that was not the case 
then the house needed to achieve at least 3 passes from the 5 test locations for the 
remaining 2 tests to pass.    
 
 
Structural Quality Test Test Locations 
Scala Penetrometer 
3 tests per house ( 1 on each side and 1 in 
the front) 
Bearing capacity at the founding level of the 
pads required. Test to 1.0 metre below 
footing.  
Note water table depth. 
 
Rebound or Schmidt Hammer Testing 
5 tests per house on the 200x200 columns 
are shown in the plan. Tests to be around 300 
mm above floor level and in the core of the 
column. Testing should be to the concrete 
rather than plastered finish. 
Take 5 readings minimum at each test 
location.  Record readings in MPa units 
 
Cover meter 
5 tests per house to confirm the size of the 
vertical rebar and the cover of the 5 
200x200mm columns indicated on the plan. 
Record the outside to outside distance 
between vertical reinforcing in the indicated 
columns. 
 
Table 1: Test locations. 
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Research Objectives  
• Ensure structural quality control in the field for the programme and ultimately to 
construct durable and seismically safe houses.   
 
Research results  
The quality testing regime was then applied to 1,096 houses over a 2 month period using 
2 teams of between 3-4 people each. These teams were lead by Chang and Zuo in the 
field with support and visits by Potangaroa and Wilkinson. 
 
Each team was able to completely survey around 10 houses per day. It was planned to 
do scala tests first and to eliminate houses with foundation issues. This did not prove to 
be feasible and teams found it logistically easier to sweep through doing all the testing at 
once rather than just the scala and then re-visiting. The scala test proved to be the 
slowest and the most physical of the 3 tests. It required a minimum of 2 people but was 
more comfortable with 3 while the other two tests could be done by one person.  A 3rd 
month of data processing completed the testing and set up the locally based teams for 
ongoing construction monitoring. 
 
The houses were spread between 4 geographical locations, 2 were where people 
returned to their original house sites which were coastal, usually flat with a high water 
table (Original1BA and Original2L) while the other two were to new sites away from 
coastal Banda Aceh and in the hills (New1S and New2J). The break down of the 3 test 
results at each location are shown in table 2 below and it generally indicates a poor 
performance across all 3 test areas.  
 
Several of the houses required a 2nd partial or complete re-survey to confirm earlier 
results as is often the case. There were many issues locating “original” houses and 
despite having a sophisticated GIS system, application of the maps produced by this 
system in the field produce confusion. Houses were not where they were shown and were 
only found based on local knowledge of that particular person; houses were on different 
plots and some were in different neighbourhoods. It seemed that while the previous field 
staff were aware of the changes these were not reflected nor ammended in the GIS. In 
addition, new streets had been constructed but what was perhaps most frustrating was 
that the same house numbering had been used in different villages. This resulted in re-
surveying complete villages. It seemed that changes of staff and loose control of the input 
process resulted in parts of the data from different villages being entered into the 
database. The lesson from this was to create one’s own data base and use that as the 
deliverable rather than the field data sheets but the only reason this input approach was 
adopted was because it was being directly input into the GIS system.  There is a need for 
care when using such technology in post disaster reconstruction and while there is a “we 
are in control” feel about the maps that a GIS system produces the practical reality of 
updating and amending can often mean such information is at best dated. 
 
Issues of certification and demolish/not demolish assessment also became apparent after 
the testing had been completed and while one was comfortable certifying the results of 
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the testing the decision to demolish the house solely on the testing data seemed 
inadequate unless costs were also included. For example, some houses that passed the 
structural criteria needed extensive replacement of doors, windows and their frames. 
These would out weigh the cost of starting anew. Additionally, the breakeven cost point 
between demolition or strengthen was initially estimated at around 40% construction 
completion, any house beyond that should be strengthen if it passed the testing or not 
tested if it was less than 40% However, there were two different guides for how this 40% 
was gauged by the agency staff and the variation in costs for new houses meant that this 
40% level was also changing. Therefore, making the decision to demolish or not based 
solely on the structural testing may not have produced the optimal outcome for the 
agency and potentially for the beneficiaries. Nonetheless, this was done and the 40% 
guideline was used. 
 
The overall figures are tabulated in table 2 below.  
 
Structural Quality Test Failure Rates Location Total House 
Numbers 
Scala Rebound Cover 
House 
Demolition 
Numbers 
Original1BA 329 28 (9%) 73(22%) 58(18%) 101(31%) 
Original2L 390 81(21%) 43(11%) 20(5%) 116(30%) 
New1S 188 3(2%) 13(7%) 0(0%) 15(8%) 
New2J 189 4(2%) 53(28%) 11(6%) 58(31%) 
TOTALS 1096 116(11%) 182(17%) 89(8%) 290(26%) 
Table 2: Test results  
Discussion and conclusions   
The impact of location was apparent in the higher failure rate for scala testing of coastal 
compared to hill sites with original sites being between 5-10 times more likely to have 
poor bearing soils. The Original sites were invariably next to ponds or swamps and hence 
a higher failure rate was not unexpected. It was partially offset by the better performance 
characteristics of clays under seismic conditions as laid out by Stockwell’s work (which is 
the used in New Zealand and Australia for interpreting scala results) and finally by wider 
mountain stone foundations (Stockwell,1977). Moreover, the rural/ agricultural context of 
Original2L over the more urban Original1BA is perhaps evident with the former being 3 
times more likely to have poor soil bearing capacity than an urban context.  
  
However, this did not carry over into the potential for better aggregates and presumably 
better concrete that could be achieved in hill sites rather then coastal sites (where it had 
to be hauled in). Rebound tests were comparable poor between the two locations with the 
lowest performance being on a hill site. It would appear that of the 3 tests concrete 
strength was the hardest to achieve (though a pass threshold of 10MPa could not be 
described as onerous). Cement is expensive and together with the onsite mixing process 
used (usually manually on the ground) and the building culture outlined earlier did give 
poor results in all areas.  
There are several humanitarian standards such as Sphere but there are none that 
address the issue of quality and construction standards for buildings (Sphere, 2010). This 
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maybe due to the cultural split commonly seen in aid organisations between a 
humanitarian approach (where Sphere applies) versus a development approach (Fitz 
Gerald et al, 2002). A humanitarian approach is typified by tents and the development 
approach by permanent houses and while there are now guidelines for tents, one is 
usually reliant on national codes and commonly used in-country building practices to 
direct the design and construction of permanent houses (Boen, 2005). In this case, 
neither of these provided international aid agencies and their donors with the level of 
comfort that what they were building was “equitable” or even adequate? Should for 
example, houses provided as aid be to a lower structural standard then what would be 
required in the donor’s country? In part the answer was a “yes” because of the inertia of 
locally industry in bringing about change. However, the testing regime suggested and 
trialled in this paper opens up an alternative approach to that change that is direct, 
specific and measurable.  
 
 
The testing data was more complicated than first imagined and re-testing was required in 
several instances. For example, in the original sites it became apparent that many houses 
had been built over the covered in concrete slab of the previous house. Thus, readings 
were simple halted once testing reached the slab and without adequate notes the test 
was recorded a failed because it had not gone to the required depth. But these were the 
details compared to earlier comments. 
In conclusion, the terms standards and quality are often intermixed. Standards are 
minimum requirements while quality exists somewhere beyond. And while these tests do 
establish a minimum standard they perhaps as found in this case study they do provide a 
basis to promote a quality of construction beyond simply minimum. The situations that 
humanitarian aid organisations are faced with are invariably at the lower end of standards 
and such robust and portable tests as these with their immediate results better define the 
quality in addition to the required standard of construction. 
 
 
 
and hence the case study approach adopted It is because of this situat reasons that such 
an approach  which is perhaps even more unfortunate as it means that such situations 
will be or could be repeated.   
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Key Lessons Learned   
• Structural quality control is required. Preferably it should be included from the 
start of a project. 
• The criteria and pass strategy need to be carefully balanced.  
• The testing procedures adopted worked well and could be the basis for future 
programmes.  
• Culture, both of the local construction industry and of the aid organisation will 
impact on the perceived need for a structural quality programme. 
• The cultural split between aid and development common to aid organisations 
surprisingly can interfere with the perceived value of structural testing 
programmes. 
• Contractors and staff appreciated the immediate testing feed back which 
mitigated the earlier social stand off between staff and contractors.   
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